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The interchange over the details of accelerated depreciation offers a useful backdrop 
against which to consider a more general issue: the intellectual coherence of the tax ex- 
penditure budgets. The larger concept of tax expenditures was what motivated Kahn to 
examine the "normalcy" of accelerated depreciation 13 years ago. And, to our eyes at 
least, the issues raised by the concept are no less interesting today than they were in 
1979. 
The various tax expenditure budgets prepared in the legislative and executive 
branches purport to carry out a straightforward task. They claim to identify those situ- 
ations in which Congress has departed from the "normative," "normal," or "correct" 
tax rule in a way that is equivalent to the appropriation of public funds. Or, as it is 
sometimes put, they expose circumstances in which Congress has chosen to subsidize 
certain activities indirectly, through the Internal Revenue Code. 
Yet, the very statement of the task exposes its Achilles heel. It assumes the existence 
of one true, "correct," "normative" rule of federal income taxation that should be 
applied to any given transaction. The collection of all such rules stands as a kind of 
Platonic Internal Revenue Code, an implicit reprimand to the flawed efforts of our mor- 
tal Congress. 
We believe that questions of tax policy are more complicated than that. An ideal 
Internal Revenue Code makes no more sense than an ideal Environmental Protection 
Act or an ideal Penal Code. An income tax stands inside, not outside, the society that 
enacts it. 
The particular contours of our federal income tax serve to reaffirm public values that 
are "normative" in every sense of the word except the one used by advocates of tax ex- 
penditure budgets. The disallowance of a deduction for illegal bribes confirms that we 
think they are naughty. Similarly, the limitation on losses from wagering transactions 
shows that we do not consider them to be an appropriate foundation for a career. 
Conversely, the exclusion from income of tort recoveries is an expression of public 
compassion. And our refusal to tax people when their neighbors help them move furni- 
ture, or (as some have suggested) when they enjoy a few moments of leisure, suggests a 
shared sense of a private domain in which even the tax collector will respect people's 
right to be left alone. 
Experts can help to clarify the implications of one tax policy choice over another. 
They can show how one choice favors one particular set of moral, political, or eco- 
nomic commitments over another. They can argue for greater consistency in the way 
tensions among such commitments are resolved. They can estimate the differences 
in the amount and distribution of revenues that would be collected under different 
regimes. But, the ultimate choice must rest with the citizen and got the oracle. 
The Choice Among Utopias 
Let us describe a series of perspectives that are frequently presented concerning the 
ideal nature of an income tax: 
(I) For some observers of the tax scene, any tax that alters citizen behavior is terribly 
unfortunate. Such observers decry any tax that alters individuals' economic incentives 
from what they would have been in a world with no taxes and a perfect marketplace. They 
would prefer that the government raise its revenues exclusively by taxing (a) activities 
that generate negative externalities, and (b) goods for which the demand is entirely in- 
elastic. Since no income tax can pretend to be nondistortional, such observers view all 
income tax as tainted by a kind of "original sin." 
(2) Other, more practically minded observers, worry that the taxes that would satisfy 
perspective (1) would not generate enough revenues for the government to finance its 
current level of operations. They believe that Nicholas Kaldor had it right almost 40 
years ago, when he argued that the proper income tax system is what we now call a 
consumption tax. Such observers are willing to accept the fact that a consumption tax 
biases taxpayers' choice between labor and leisure. They console themselves with the 
observation that at least a consumption tax avoids biasing the choice between savings 
and current consumption. 
(4) An\aolhcr trot coIdnnenbtod objects that a consumption tax that would satisfy 
p e n w v e  (2) ignome the new economic power teflwted in congereled, uncon~umcd, 
nealy'acqiind wdth.  They cantard that all guch eamomic power rhuuld be reckoned 
in the tax base, perhaps ae a pmxy for an (ideal) wealth tax. For such obwrvem, the 
touchstom of income taxadon mu& be the sum of consumption and wealth accumula- 
tion - what is c~mmmly known as H;aig-Simons income. 
(4) Still other cmmentators find fault with the pure Haig-Simons approach en- 
d-d under perspective (3). It would offend sueh conhentators' ticdons of privacy 
to ttm citizens m unrealized asset appreciation and on imputed hicome iram services 
or duoab1~ goods. Or, at least, it would require a preposterous expenditme of adminis- 
trative resources in an ultimately futile quest. These observers would prefer that we tax 
H a @ - 5 b s  income to the extent it is realized through market interactions. 
(5) Yet another set of commentators finds fault with even the market-delimited, real- 
ization-qualified version of the Haig-Simons approacPi@suggested by pempec€ive (4). 
They believe that sueh an approach unacceptably distorts investor inmntives, leading 
them to overconsume and undersave, to indulge in too much leisure and not enough 
work, While they are in sympathy with the political vision that would allocate the tax 
burden according to accumulating economic power, they favor qualifications to that 
vision whenever the cost to productive incentives appears to jeopardize economic 
growth. 
(6) Finally, one finds the United States Congress. It apparently believes that even the 
approach dictated by perspective (5) would leave the American economy in the wrong 
plak Not enough research and development, not enough low-income housing, not 
enough money in the hands of working families with children, not enough money in 
the hands of churches-and museums, too many renters and not enough homeowners, 
etc., etc., etc. 
If one is prone to depression, one can view the foregoing list of perspectives from (1) 
to (6) as identifying a kind of linear decline. Each is one step further from the Garden 
of Eden of distortion-free taxation. We view them differently. We prefer to see each 
perspective as emphasizing different elements in a basket of normative values - effi- 
ciency (in the neoclassical economic sense), consumption/savings neutrality, privacy, 
equity, administrabilits-charity, pragmatism, etc. 
What is disturbing about the language of tax expenditures is its tone of moral abso- 
lutism. The tax expenditure budget is said to distinguish "normal" tax practice from 
that which is deviant. Sometimes it is said to distinguish provisions that ;ae "norma- 
tive" (?) from those that am (presumably) nonnormative (?!). This language is doubly 
confusing. First, it suggests that provisions that fit within the implicit baselide of the 
tax expenditure budget are- somehow pure, safe, and good. They should not be changed 
because "neutral" principles have blessed them. Conversely, the language suggests 
that provisions that fall outside the implicit baseline of the tax expenditure budget (tax 
expenditures) are somehow corrupt, dangerous, and evil. They should be changed as 
soon as possible to conform with the "neutral" position. lb flirt with them is to call 
one's probity into question. 
This is, of course, a bit of an overstatement. But, it captures the rhetorical direction 
of the tax expenditure budget. And that rhetorical direction is grossly misleading. The 
tax expenditure budget's conception of an appropriate tax base has no legitimate claim 
to establishing the terms of political debate. It should not immunize provisions of the 
code from political discussion, nor should it change the burden of justification for 
others. I =  _ 
The Illusion of Value-Free Precision - An Example 
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The reference point for construction of the tax expenditure budget is a measure of 
taxable income that is close to position (4) above, with some variations. That may be 
some people's Platonic Internal Revenue Code, but it is obviously not everyone's. The 
choice among perspectives is a contestable, contingent, political decision. Thus, while 
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Obfuscating the Debate - Another ExampIe 
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In addition to this central conceptual flaw, tax expenditure budgets b v e  ale m&tu- 
nate tendency to confuse by inviting an easy equation d "tax e-&&s?' with d h c t  
expenditures of federal dollars. Tax expenditures autumaticdly b e c q ~  "subsi@es." 
And central questions about the appropriate goah hr our American k c o k  tax get lost 
in the transition. 
Consider the additional standard deductions available ta the blind a d  to the elderly, 
listed as tax expenditures by the Congressiohal Budget Office. How might it be man- 
ingful to speak of these deductions as "subsidies"? Surely they do not subsidize behavior 
that Congress desires. We may be abk to make ourselves lwk ol&r or younger, but 
dates of birth seem immutable. And sadistic though our elected representatives might 
be, no one believes they want taxpayers to blind themselves. 
No, in this context, the only conceivable way to think of the deductions as sub&!ies 
is to emphasize that they show solicitude for a particular category of people - a Eorm 
of weIfare expenditure through the Internal Revenue Code, ib be sure, t l~e  solicitude 
takes the form of a deduction against taxable income rather than that of, example, a 
refundable credit against taxes along the lines of t$e Earned Income Bm credit. Thus, 
it is more symbolic than financial solicitude in the case of blind snd elderly people who 
would have no taxable income even without the extra deductions. But, some would say, 
that is precisely the point. The deductions are not only subsidiw but also nasty, up- 
side-down subsidies that benefit the elderly and blind rich but not the elderly and bnd. 
poor. 
The pro1 rn with this line of argument is that it tempts us to snc& around t h q g h  
the back door to reach a conclusion without codkmting the~contestdbk premises 
derlying that conclusion. In this context, the conclusion that the deductions an tu 
expenditures might presume that under a "normative" income tax, all taxpayers Mnuld 
receive the same "standard deduction." It might be ugdewtaod as a initial YWQ 
bracket" in the progressive rate structure. But if that is so, why are not differences in 
standard deduction (or in the rate structure itself) based on marital status just as objec- 
tionable? Such differences exist in current law, but are not listed in the tax expenditure 
budget. 
More directly, why isn't any standard deduction for nonitemized expenditures a tax 
expenditure? Why isn't the existence of marginal rates below the highest marginal rate 
a tax expenditure? What is the logic that protects a progressive rate structure from 
being branded nonnormative? 
The debate over progressive taxation continues to follow its uneasy course. Among 
the defenses that seem to retain substantial support, however, are variants of the 
"equal-sacrifice" position - the idea that the burdens of government should exact a 
roughly equal sacrifice from each taxpayer. Such defenses turn out to be theoretically 
difficult. It is easy to assume that any individual will experience a declining marginal 
utility of income, as he or she moves from "necessities" to "luxuries." But, there is no 
reason to think that different individuals will see marginal utility decline at the same 
rate, or in the same pattern. And at some level, the interpersonal utility comparisons 
implicit in the purest conception of "equal sacrifice" become meaningless. 
But this defense of progressive taxation is willing to live with a somewhat less pure 
concept of "equal sacrifice." It makes the social judgment that rich people can afford 
to spare more of their next dollar of income than poor people can. Rather than measur- 
ing citizens' personal utility curves, the rate structure can be said to describe a social 
judgment about what standardized hypothetical utility curve we are willing to attribute 
to citizens for the purpose of allocating the tax burden. 
Note something about this logic: it could equally well support arguments in favor of 
certain forms of public direct expenditures on behalf of all poor people. Yet that fact Sirzce any income tax, 110 
alone is iloi enough to lead tax expenditure budgets to include the low marginal rates matter 120w defined, will in- 
found in a progressive rate structure. We presume that is because one might plausibly Juerzce citizen behavior, it 
think it especially relevant in the tax context - a reason to lower an individual's tax would be a strange tax sys- 
burden that might not be powerful enough to warrant the creation of a program of di- 
rect public expenditures. tern that pretended to ignor-e 
This same logic, however, can also support the special deductions for the blind and those effects. 
the elderly. Such deductions can be seen as rough adjustments to the standardized hypo- 
thetical utility curve - a crude recognition that those who are blind or aged must spend 
more to meet their basic needs than young, sighted taxpayers must spend. Moreover, 
one might plausibly think such a recognition to be especially relevant in the tax con.. 
text. A supporter of equal-sacrifice progressivity could plausibly support an adjustment 
to the rate schedules of the blind and the elderly without necessarily feeling compelled 
to support a direct expenditure program on their behalf. 
Conclusion 
Tax expenditure budgets divide all tax provisions into categories. One category com- 
prises "pure tax" provisions that appear to serve no "nontax" goals. The deduction 
allowed a business for paying a commission to a salesman may be a representative ex- 
ample. The other category comprises "pure subsidy" provisions that seem to serve 
only nontax goals. The Earned Income Tax Credit, which subsidizes the wages of low- 
income workers with children, may be a representative example. To the extent tax 
provisions might arguably serve both tax and nontax goals, the function of the tax 
expenditure budget is to decide which set of goals predominates. 
Our point is that very few items fit neatly into one category or the other. Virtually all 
provisions of the tax laws have elements that some individuals might consider indepen- 
dent of the "core" task of measuring a particular concept of "income." On the other 
hand, since any income tax, no matter how defined, will influence citizen behavior, it 
would be a strange tax system that pretended to ignore those effects. Those effects are 
properly important considerations in determining which conception of income we 
would like to use. 
We think democratic debate would be promoted if we knew how much additional 
revenue could be gained by repealing each of the code provisions shown in the various 
tax expenditure budgets. as well as who would bear the incidence of that additional rev- 
enue. We think democratic debate would also be promoted in precisely the same way. 
however. if we knew how much additional revenue could be gained through a host of 
changes to provisions that are not shown on the tax expenditure budgets. Most tax pro- 
visions. like most policy -judgments. are good only as long as their price tags are not 
exorbitant. Here again, the tax expenditure budget hides that fact by suggesting that 
certain features of the tax system are different in kind from others. 
More generally. our critical view of tax expenditure budgets is pragmatic, not ni- 
hilistic. We do not believe that all arguments are equally good. or equally persuasive. 
Indeed. the two of us often disagree between ourselves about whether a particular ar- 
gument is persuasive or not. But we both believe strongly that the need to evaluate such 
arguments on their ("normative") merits cannot be obviated by talismanic reference to 
an "expert" understanding of one particularized vision of the "normal" or "ideal" tax 
base. 
We find it valuable to point out those provisions of the code that depart from what 
one would expect to find if one's sole concern were measuring accumulations of wealth 
during a taxable year. We also find it valuable to point out the different conceptions of Douglas A. Kal~n is the Pall1 G. 
"consumption" that might underlie arguments for or against the allowance of a particu- Kalrper Professor of h w l .  He Ila.~ 
lar deduction. But in precisely the same way, we find it valuable to point out the written ~ ~ i d e l j ?  on the subject of federc 
different conceptions of "privacy" or "family" or "charity" that might underlie argu- taration. He is the arcthor o f  t~10 
ments for or against other provisions of the code. Our tau laws respond to fundamental casehooks and several text books on 
questions about what values matter to us as a society. The tax expenditure budget pre- tasation. He began his academic 
sumes that some of us should be deemed to know the answers better than others. career at Michigan in 1964. 
Consider the question, "Should the National Zoo house panda bears?" If one were to 
hold a public hearing on the matter, one could expect to hear a range of interesting argu- 
ments presented by citizens interested in issues ranging from urban planning to animal 
rights, from budgetary policy to biological diversity. Yet. consider how you would re- 
act to a person who offered the following testimony: 
1 am from the American Society of Zookeeping Experts. In my expert 
opinion. and in the opinion of my fellow experts. 'normative zoos' are. by 
definition, zoos that house no animals other than bears(!). Following the tradi- 
tions of my discipline. I have accordingly engaged in substantial research into 
the question whether panda bears are truly bears or merely raccoons. 1 report 
to you today that they are raccoons. Accordingly, 1 have placed panda bears on 
the Roster of Prohibited Animals. 
Tax experts, like zookeeping experts, are important members of American society. 
Their ideas should figure prominently in debates over national tax policy. The question 
for us is whether tax expenditure budgets grounded in a contestable vision of tax policy 
are ultimately any more valuable to such debate than a Roster of Prohibited Animals 
grounded in an idiosyncratic vision of zookeeping. 
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